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of the Res Gestae Doctrine
by H. Patrick Furman and Ann England
This article provides a briefhistory of the doctrine ofres gestae and an analysis of its current usage in both Colo-
rado state andfederal courts.
he doctrine of resgestae allows the introduction of evidence
necessary to give context to a charged offense. The doc-
trine has been used extensively in Colorado in recent years
to admit a wide variety of evidence. The federal courts treat the
doctrine quite differently, despite a shared common law origin.
This article provides a brief history of the doctrine, describes the
definitions that have been given to resgestae in Colorado decisions,
discusses some of the cases in which the doctrine has been used,
and addresses the interplay between res gestae and the rules relat-
ing to relevance and "other acts" evidence. The article then address-
es the treatment of the doctrine in the Tenth Circuit, noting some
important but perhaps dissolving differences between the state and
federal approaches.
The History of Res Gestae
"Resgestae" is translated as "things done,"' and generally is used
to describe the circumstances in which potentially inadmissible ev-
idence might otherwise be admitted to give context to the charged
crime.The doctrine has its roots in the common law and appears to
have come into common usage in the early 1800s to explain the
admission into evidence of statements that were made at the time
an event occurred.2 The justifications were that witnesses needed
to include such statements to complete the telling of the story of
the event itself, and that the spontaneity of such statements ren-
dered them reliable.
3
The first reference to the doctrine by the U.S. Supreme Court
came in 1817, in a decision holding that an agent's admissions
against his principal are admissible when they are part of the res
gestae.4 In 1827, the Court held that the statements of a co-con-
spirator were admissible against a defendant because they were part
of the resgestaes Of course, these two particular applications of the
doctrine are now governed by hearsay provisions of the Federal
Rules of Evidence (F.R.E.). 6 Neither of the cases provided an ex-
planation of the term.
In 1837, the Supreme Court ventured a definition of res gestae
as synonymous with "surrounding circumstances."7 Using this def-
inition, the Court approved the admission of a legislative commit-
tee report that dealt with both parties and the subject matter of the
litigation. In the ensuing 100 years, the term was used to justify the
admission of evidence that today is admitted as an exception to
hearsay, including statements of then-existing state of mind,8 ex-
cited utterances, 9 the rule of completeness, 10 and statements made
by a party opponent."
The Colorado history of res gestae begins in 1872 in a case that
described it as an exception to the general ban on hearsay'a2 Like
the federal history just described, the initial Colorado history of res
gestae is replete with cases that use the doctrine to address evidence
in situations that would now be governed by the Colorado Rules
of Evidence (C.R.E. or Rules). For example, the doctrine was used
in 1873 to admit the statement of a co-conspirator; 3 in 1875 to
admit the statement of a declarant as to his state of mind;14 and in
1893 to bar the admission of statements that did not fall within the
dying declarations exception.'
5
This admittedly incomplete history suggests that res gestae
should have been subsumed within the subsequently adopted rules
of evidence. Support for this conclusion comes from a 1949 deci-
sion of the U.S. Supreme Court that quoted extensively from an
evidence treatise by Wigmore. 16 Wigmore's position was unam-
biguous: "The phrase 'resgestad has long been not only entirely use-
less, but even positively harmful." 17 It is "useless" in Wigmore's
view because every application of the doctrine is actually part of,
and explained by, "some other well-established principle." 18 It is
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harmful in his view because "it invites the confusion of one rule
with another and thus creates uncertainty as to the limitations of
both." 19 A similar, but more modern view, has been expressed by
McCormick, who described resgestae as "a historical relic to be jet-
tisoned from modern hearsay analysis."
20
The academic suggestion that the doctrine of resgestae ought to
be jettisoned has not been accepted by the courts, at least not in
Colorado. People v. Workman 2' expressly rejected the argument that
the doctrine was superseded by the adoption of the C.R.E., and
subsequent cases make clear that the doctrine is still alive. In fact,
the current use of res gestae in Colorado state courts appears to go
far beyond even the limited historical use about which Wigmore
and McCormick so strongly complained.
The Recent History of Res Gestae in Colorado
People v. Quintana22 includes a comprehensive discussion of res
gestae by the Colorado Supreme Court. This 1994 opinion ad-
dressed the decision of the trial court to admit three statements
made by a defendant charged with murder. The three statements
involved threats to murder other people made by the defendant
during or while driving away from the murder at issue. At trial, the
parties analyzed the statements under C.R.E. 404(b). A four-jus-
tice majority of the Court held that the statements were admissible
as res gestate.
Quintana offered several definitions of res gestae. These defini-
tions included:
1) "[e]vidence of other offenses or acts that is not extrinsic to the
offense charged, but rather is part of the criminal episode or
transaction with which the defendant is charged ... to pro-
vide the fact-finder with a flil and complete understanding
of the events surrounding the crime and the context in which
the charged crime occurred";
23
2) evidence that "is generally linked in time and circumstances
with the charged crime, or forms an integral and natural part
of an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the
story of the crime for the jury;"
24
3) "the circumstances, facts and declarations which arise from
the main event and serve to illustrate its character";25 and
4) "evidence that is closely related in both time and nature to the
charged offense."
26
Later in the opinion, while distinguishing resgestae from other acts
evidence, the Court cited with approval an Eleventh Circuit hold-
ing describing res gestate as evidence that is "inextricably inter-
twined with evidence regarding the charged offense."
27
Whichever definition is controlling, the statements at issue in
Quintana fit. The statements were linked in time with the charged
murder because they occurred either during or immediately sub-
sequent to the murder. The statements "are all linked in time to a
single criminal episode, and indeed, form a natural part of the
criminal episode as a whole." 28 Quintana claimed that he was in-
toxicated and incapable of forming the requisite intent; the state-
ments were inextricably linked to this claim to prove that Quin-
tana "was conscious that his actions amounted to killing, was con-
scious of the meaning of the word 'kill' and could verbalize his
desire to engage in the same action again." 29 Thus, under even the
narrowest of the definitions in Quintana, these statements were ad-
missible as resgestae.
The majority's view was rejected by three justices. They argued
that the statements should be analyzed under Rule 404(b) because
the prosecution did not use the statements simply to refute Quin-
tana's state of mind, but also used the statements to show that he
intended to eliminate witnesses-that is, that he had a bad char-
acter. The justices found that the evidence had no other probative
value. The fact that the statements were made in close temporal
proximity to the murder did not automatically make them relevant.
According to the minority, the statements should not have been
admitted because they "fail to provide an understanding of the con-
text in which the crime occurred or set a background for the events
leading up to the victim's murder."30 Ultimately, the minority con-
curred in the result. They concluded admission of the statements
was harmless in light of the other overwhelming evidence of guilt.
The first time the Colorado Supreme Court addressed res ges-
tae after Quintana, it reversed convictions for sexual assault on a
child because the trial court erroneously admitted, as resgestae, evi-
dence of three other sexual assaults, allegedly committed by the
same defendant against the same victim. People v. Rollins31 held
that the uncharged incidents "were neither contemporaneous with
nor provided a background for the offense charged." 32 The charged
offense occurred between June 1 and June 6, 1989, and the three
uncharged offenses all occurred between March and June of that
same year. The findings that this uncharged conduct did not help
explain the charged conduct, and that the other incidents were not
contemporaneous with the charged offense, are quite different
from the findings reached in most of the subsequent opinions de-
scribed in the next section.
Subsequent Applications
of Res Gestae in Colorado
The doctrine has been employed in a wide variety of factual set-
tings since Quintana and Rollins.The following discussion of cases
is merely illustrative and is not intended to be exhaustive.
In People v. Fears,33 the court of appeals affirmed the convictions
of the defendant in connection with the murder of a witness to an
armed robbery. The court held that the robbery was the motive for
the killing, and thus was resgestae. The robbery was, in the court's
view, "impossible to separate" from the murder.34 The court of ap-
peals also held that the trial court did not need to make an inde-
pendent determination whether the defendant committed the rob-
bery as it would have to do with other crimes evidence.
People v. Young 35 also involved a strong tie between the other
criminal activity and the charged criminal activity. Young was
charged with the murder of a man with whom he had purchased
marijuana that the two men had intended to resell. The two were
en route from the place of purchase to the place of sale, and the
marijuana may have been the source of a falling out between the
two, thus leading to the murder. This tie between other criminal
activity and the charged criminal activity helped the jury under-
stand the context of the charged activity.
The defendant in People v. Lovato36 was charged with the rob-
bery of an at-risk adult. The trial court permitted the introduction,
as res gestae, of evidence that the defendant committed another
robbery shortly after the robbery at issue, and that he was there-
after apprehended after getting stuck in traffic. The court of ap-
peals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admit-
ting evidence of the second robbery. The second robbery was part
of a single criminal episode, and was logically relevant to prove Lo-
vato's identity as the perpetrator of the charged robbery. The court
36 The Colorado Lawyer I June 2009 I Vol. 38, No. 6
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held that the evidence of the second robbery was not so inflamma-
tory that it should have been excluded under C.R.E. 403.
In People v. Asberry,37 a police officer stopped the defendant be-
cause he believed the defendant was violating an area restriction.
On contact, the defendant was found to have an outstanding mis-
demeanor warrant. He then was found in possession of a con-
trolled substance. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's de-
termination that the evidence about the area restriction was resges-
tae, "because it gave the jury an understanding of why defendant
was stopped and thus, formed a natural and integral part of an ac-
count of the crime."38 Similarly, evidence of the outstanding war-
rant was relevant, because it "explained why he was taken into cus-
tody."39 The testimony was found to comport with the require-
ments of C.R.E. 403 because, although damaging, the testimony
was not unfair, and no further testimony was adduced about the
area restriction or the warrant.
In People v. Lehnert,40 the court of appeals held that the trial
court erred in permitting the introduction, as resgestae, of evidence
that a defendant, charged with attempted murder of a police offi-
cer, had held a party some years earlier to celebrate the murder of a
police officer. The court of appeals held that, because the party was
not contemporaneous with the murder and did not "illustrate its
character," it was not admissible as res gestae.41 However, the court
went on to find the error harmless.
In People v. Coney,42 a murder prosecution, the court of appeals
held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting,
as res gestae, evidence concerning defendant's pending drug cases
and his concern about finding the snitch. The court found that the
pending cases and the concern about finding the snitch were inex-
tricably intertwined with the charged crimes. The evidence was rel-
evant and probative of defendant's motive.
In People v. Gomez,43 an undercover detective who purchased
drugs from the defendant was allowed to testify that "he had re-
ceived information about an individual named Joshua Gomez who
had been selling narcotics, including a description of Gomez's ve-
hicle and its license plate number."44 The trial court admitted the
evidence as part of the context of the drug buy and the court of ap-
peals agreed, describing the evidence as res gestae, because it "ex-
plained to the jury why the police had set up the buy with
Gomez." 45 The court cited a 1998 case in which evidence of two
prior marijuana transactions was admitted to set the stage for the
charged offense.46
Domestic Violence Cases
Cases involving domestic violence often involve daims that the
defendant previously has engaged in similar behavior against the
alleged victim. Generally, such evidence must be analyzed under
C.R.E. 404(b) and CRS § 18-6-801.5; however, in certain situa-
tions, it may be considered under a resgestae analysis.
In People v. Jaramillo,47 the trial court allowed the introduction
of testimony that the argument between the defendant and his al-
leged victim (his wife) "had been building" and that it was a result
of his "extreme jealousy."48 The court of appeals found this to be
res gestae.
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Another domestic violence case, People v. Merklin,49 addressed
the introduction of evidence in defendant's trial for violating a re-
straining order that defendant had called the victim on other oc-
casions. A juror wanted to ask the victim why she had not called
police earlier; the victim indicated, in camera, that she had some
fear of the defendant due to the other calls. Ultimately, the trial
court allowed the juror's questions for the purpose of showing the
victim's state of mind. The court of appeals noted that the ques-
tions and answers also were appropriate in the context ofresgestae.
Limits on Res Gestae
The problem with trying to establish limits on resgestae is illus-
trated by People v. Lucas,50 a 1999 decision of the court of appeals
that approved the admission, at defendant's murder trial, of evi-
dence that he had committed a burglary three days earlier. The de-
fendant and his friends left Colorado Springs, traveling by foot and
hitchhiking, burglarized a home in Walsenburg, and stole a com-
puter, which they then sold to help finance the trip. The court reit-
erated the traditional language that resgestae evidence:
provides the fact-finder with a fill and complete understanding
of the events surrounding the crime and the context in which
the charged crime occurred, and includes events closely related
in both time and nature to the charged offense.5'
The court then held that the evidence of the burglary demon-
strated to the jury that the defendant and his friends left Colorado
Springs on a long journey with no means of support and no vehi-
cle. "They began to commit crimes in order to support themselves.
It was in this context that defendant's group encountered, robbed
and killed the victim." 52 Such language seems perilously close to
simply admitting evidence of bad character.
In a decision that, like Lucas, seems to touch the boundaries of
resgestae, the court of appeals in People v. St.James5 3 upheld defen-
dant's conviction for sexual exploitation of a child against a claim
that unfairly prejudicial evidence was admitted as res gestae. The
court of appeals deemed evidence of the defendant's possession of
large amounts of money, and the alleged victim's drug dealing on
his behalf, to be res gestae because it showed "aspects of the rela-
tionship demonstrating defendant's influence over [the victim], her
desire to please him, and, ultimately, the power defendant had in
this relationship." 54 Neither the alleged source of the money nor
the temporal proximity of the drug dealing are discussed.
The defendant in People v. Kyle55 was charged with sexual as-
sault on a child-the daughter of his girlfriend--and testified that
he cared about the victim and was like a father figure to her. A
therapist testified to defendant's angry behavior during family
counseling sessions, and a caseworker testified to defendant's anger
on learning that the caseworker was recommending out-of-home
placement for the victim.The defendant never objected to this tes-
timony, and the court of appeals deemed it admissible as resgestae
using a plain error analysis.
The pattern that emerges from these opinions is one of expand-
ing the doctrine of res gestae. The time and subject matter limita-
tions set forth in Quintana and Rollins have been significantly loos-
ened by these opinions. Whether traditional notions of relevancy
restrict this expansion of the doctrine is addressed in the next sec-
tion.
Res Gestae and Rule 403
C.R.E. 403, like its federal counterpart, is one of the most basic
rules of evidence. Given that the definition of relevancy in Rule
401 is quite broad, Rule 403 provides a check on the admissibility
of otherwise relevant evidence when its "probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice .... -56 This bal-
ancing test is applied in a wide variety of contexts.
Quintana made clear that resgestae evidence is still subject to the
traditional relevancy analysis. "Resgestae evidence is admissible on-
ly if it is relevant .... "57 The trial court's finding that the statements
were logically relevant to refite Quintana's claim that he did not
form the requisite mens tea was within the discretion afforded trial
courts on evidentiary decisions of this sort. Likewise, because the
statements in Quintana were not given undue emphasis, no evi-
dence was introduced that Quintana attempted to act out these
statements, and the trial court gave a limiting instruction to the ju-
ry, the Rule 403 balance did not require exclusion. "Thus, taken in
context, these statements were not unduly inflammatory nor likely
to prevent the jury from making a rational decision."
5 8
People v. Jaramillo59 also makes clear that res gestae evidence
should be evaluated under the usual relevancy standards:
Regardless of whether evidence of other acts is admissible as res
gestae or for a permissible purpose under C.R.E. 404(b), evi-
dence of other acts may be excluded if it is irrelevant, C.R.E.
402, or its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice.6°
Presumably, a decision to admit evidence under a resgestae theo-
ry means that the trial court has determined that the evidence is
relevant pursuant to Rule 401 and therefore not excludable pur-
38 The Colorado Lawyer I June 2009 I Vol. 38, No. 6
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suant to Rule 402. As a practical matter,
Jaramillo seems to stand for the proposition
that res gestae evidence can be excluded
pursuant to Rule 403 if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or other concerns. The trial court has sub-
stantial discretion in conducting this bal-
ancing test.
61
When an appellate court is reviewing
the relevance balance struck by a trial court,
the appellate court must assume the maxi-
mum probative value of the evidence and
the minimum unfair prejudice. 62 People v.
Auldridge63 is apparently the only Colorado
case since the adoption of the C.R.E. to
hold that the trial court abused its discre-
tion in this regard. Auldridge was charged
with an assault involving a weapon and
claimed self-defense. The prosecutor was
allowed to cross-examine Auldridge about
his knowledge that carrying a weapon was
illegal. The court of appeals held that the
probative value of this evidence, in light of
the other evidence of defendant's state of
mind, was substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice. Finally, appellate
courts assume that jurors followed any lim-
iting instruction given in connection with
res gestae evidence.
64
Res Gestae and Rule 404
Evidence of other acts generally is controlled by C.R.E. 404(b).
That rule begins by providing that evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove a person's character and
that the person acted in conformity with that character. The rule
then creates the exception that such evidence may be admissible
for other purposes. The rule sets out a nonexhaustive list of such
other purposes.
An extensive body of appellate court decisions relating to Rule
404(b) has developed in Colorado. The seminal cases in this body
of law are People v. Garner,65 People v. Spoto,66 People v. Honey,67 and
Stull v. People.6" These cases establish a four-part test to evaluate
the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts.
Quintana makes clear that res gestae evidence is distinguished
from other acts evidence because other acts evidence generally re-
lates to events occurring "at different times and under different cir-
cumstances from the charged offense." 69 By its very nature, resges-
tae is intrinsic to the charged offense, not extrinsic to it. In fact, the
Court described res gestae evidence as "the antithesis of C.R.E.
404(b) evidence." 70
The Quintana Court referred to the seminal other acts case of
People v. Spoto7' for illustration. Spoto, like Quintana, was charged
with murder. The prosecution sought to rebut his claim of self-de-
fense by introducing evidence that he had brandished a weapon a
few weeks earlier. The Spoto Court held that this evidence was
properly characterized as other acts evidence, because it involved a
separate and distinct episode wholly independent from the offense
charged. Quintana, on the other hand, involved acts (the three
It isn't easy making people on both sides
of the table happy. However, it can be done.
Dave Rudy, Mediation
888.310.7490
statements) that occurred contemporaneously or immediately af-
ter the murder, as part of that criminal episode.
In People v. Greenlee,72 the Colorado Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine whether the court of appeals erred in hold-
ing that evidence of a defendant's plan to shoot a woman and then
hide her body-made two months before he shot a woman and
hid her body-was inadmissible as resgestae evidence at his murder
trial. The Court eventually ruled that the evidence was admissible
under either a 404(b) or a resgestae analysis, so that any possible er-
ror in admitting the evidence under a res gestae theory was harm-
less.
The distinction between resgestae evidence and other acts evi-
dence is critical. If the evidence truly is "linked in time" to and
"forms a natural part of" the offense, as described in Quintana, the
evidence is resgestae. If it is not so linked, it is necessarily other acts
evidence subject to the admissibility requirements of C.R.E.
404(b). The federal treatment of res gestae, discussed in more detail
below, also serves to illustrate this distinction.
Other Issues Relating to Res Gestae
A defendant may open the door to resgestae evidence, at least in
the sense that the defense or testimony proffered by the defendant
may alter the relevancy balance and open wider the door that al-
ready was open to res gestae evidence. For example, the defendant
in People v. Cooper73 was charged with burglarizing his mother's
home, and testified that she had invited him inside. The trial court
allowed the prosecution to cross-examine him about an incident,
The Colorado Lawyer I June 2009 I Vol. 38, No. 6 39
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three days earlier, when his mother had called the police to have
him removed from the house.
The court of appeals affirmed, noting that the prior incident be-
came part of the resgestae when the defendant opened the door by
offering his explanation of why he was inside. Similarly, in People
v. Ornelas,74 the court of appeals approved the trial court's findings
that defendant's statements about the importation of drugs by oth-
er people were res gestae in his trial for drug distribution, because
defendant asserted that the drugs that were found were for his per-
sonal use.
Resgestae evidence need not involve the defendant. In People v.
Bernabei,75 the court of appeals held that it was within the trial
court's discretion to admit evidence of two prior drug transactions
that did not involve the defendant in the defendant's trial for sell-
ing counterfeit controlled substances. The two other transactions
involved defendant's son and occurred at a home where defendant's
sale also occurred. The prosecution theory was that the evidence
was needed to explain to the jury how the undercover officer came
to be at the home. The jury was properly advised that neither
transaction involved the defendant.
Res gestate evidence also does not have to involve the alleged vic-
tim of the charged offense. In People v. Agado,76 the defendant ar-
gued with his girlfriend one evening and moved out the next
morning, but returned the next night with a gun and found a
babysitter there. He raised the gun, it discharged, and the babysitter
was killed. The trial court allowed the admission of evidence of the
argument with the girlfriend as resgestae.
In People v. Skufca,77 the Colorado Supreme Court addressed the
question whether the introduction of res gestae evidence against a
defendant might impermissibly chill his right to testify by making
him subject to cross-examination on the uncharged conduct. The
trial court allowed the introduction of evidence relating to another
case against the defendant, and defendant argued that he should
be allowed to assert his Fifth Amendment right to silence if he was
cross-examined about that other case. The court of appeals agreed
with the defendant's position.
7
The Supreme Court noted that the decision of a defendant
whether to testify is fundamental and must be made "freely and
without coercive influence." 79 However, the Court noted that this
decision is a tactical choice like many others that a defendant and
counsel must make during trial. The fact that the prosecution in-
troduced evidence that made it more difficult and problematic for
defendant to testify did not implicate his constitutional right to si-
lence. This is particularly true when, as here, the trial court ruled
that the scope of cross-examination would depend on the ques-
tions asked and answers given during direct examination. The
Court took this ruling to mean that it was the defendant's own tes-
timony, not evidence offered independently by the prosecution,
that would control the extent to which the defendant was forced
to testify about the uncharged misconduct.
In People v. Lovato,80 the court of appeals held that resgestae ev-
idence need not be accompanied by a limiting instruction. The fact
that a limiting instruction was in fact given inures to the benefit of
the defendant.8' The court did not explain its reasoning, but simply
cited Quintana.82
The Tenth Circuit View of Res Gestae
A discussion of the treatment of resgestae evidence by the feder-
al courts is important to federal practitioners. It also is important
to state court practitioners, because federal court interpretations of
evidence rules that are identical to the Colorado rule-although
not binding on state appellate courts-are persuasive.
8 3
As mentioned above, the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed
the issues surrounding resgestae evidence since the adoption of the
F.R.E. in 1975. In fact, in a 2007 slip opinion in a habeas case, the
Tenth Circuit noted that the defendant cited no Supreme Court
or other federal case that casts doubt on Quintana, and that the
court was not aware of any Supreme Court case defining the con-
stitutional parameters of the admissibility of res gestae evidence.
8 4
Whether the disappearance of the doctrine from Supreme Court
jurisprudence is due to a belief that the ER.E. superseded the doc-
trine, or to the fact that the issue simply has not yet made its way to
that Court, is not clear.
History of Res Gestae and 404(b) Evidence
Historically, the Tenth Circuit did not make a distinction be-
tween 404(b) evidence and res gestae-the two kinds of evidence
that Colorado state courts have labeled as being the "antithesis" of
each other, in the Tenth Circuit were considered varieties of the
same species. For example, in developing its analysis, the Tenth
Circuit relied heavily on the Fourth Circuit decision in United
States v. Masters.8 5 Masters held that the bases for admissibility list-
ed in ER.E. 404(b) are not "exhaustive" but instead are "illustra-
tive." One of the accepted bases for admissibility of other crimes is
when the evidence:
1) "furnishes part of the context of the crime";
2) is necessary to a "full presentation of the case"; or
3) is so "intimately connected with and explanatory of the crime
charges against the defendant that its proof is appropriate in
order to complete the story of the crime on trial by proving
its immediate context." 
8 6
In other words, res gestae evidence falls within the reach of the ex-
ceptions to Rule 404(b).
The Tenth Circuit followed this same analysis in United States
v. Cook.87 Cook was indicted for making false representations in a
financial document. The Tenth Circuit held that the evidence was
admissible under ER.E. 404(b), noting that the Rule governs the
admissibility of other acts evidence:
when such evidence provides part of the "context" of the crime
charged or is necessary to fully present the case; when the evi-
dence is so much a part of the "environment" of the case that it is
necessary to "complete the story of the crime" and when the 'ev-
idence of the other acts is so linked together in "point of time
and circumstances" with the crime charged with it is part of the
"resgestae" of the crime charged. 88
Res Gestae and 404(b) Evidence After 1980
Things started to change in the early 1980s. First, the Tenth
Circuit began developing a more restrictive test for determining
the admissibility of evidence pursuant to ER.E. 404(b). In United
States v. Cuch,89 the court enumerated more than ten factors trial
courts had to consider in determining the admissibility of 404(b)
evidence. These new restrictive tests encouraged courts to admit
evidence pursuant to F.R.E. 404(b) only if it fit into an category
specifically listed by ER.E. 404(b). This meant that res gestae evi-
dence that was admitted because it was part and parcel of the crime
or needed to complete the story would no longer fit into a 404(b)
analysis.
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At the same time, the Tenth Circuit began distinguishing be-
tween evidence that should be analyzed under Rule 404(b) and ev-
idence that was part and parcel of the charged offense. In United
States v. Orr,90 the defendant was charged with filing false income
tax statements. Orr had set up several false identities for which he
and others on his behalf received Internal Revenue Service refund
checks.The prosecution presented two witnesses who testified that
they previously had been involved in a similar tax refund scheme
with Orr and that they had discussed starting another scheme with
Orr. The prosecution argued this new scheme was the crime
charged.The trial court held that all of the evidence was admissible
pursuant to 404(b).
The Tenth Circuit held that the discussions regarding a new tax
refund scheme was not 404(b) evidence, but rather direct evidence
that went to the elements of the charge:
Rule 404(b) only applies to evidence of acts extrinsic to the
charged crime. An uncharged act may not be extrinsic if it was
part of the scheme for which a defendant is being prosecuted.91
Although the court did not identify the evidence as resgestae, this
language later becomes a part of the test for the admissibility ofres
gestae.
This change seems consistent with developments in 404(b) ju-
risprudence in the U.S. Supreme Court. In 1988, in Huddleston v.
United States,92 the Court created a four-part test to determine the
admissibility of 404(b) evidence. Although, Huddleston did not ad-
dress res gestae evidence, in United States v. Record,93 the Tenth Cir-
cuit case incorporating the 404(b) Huddleston test, the Court stat-
ed, in a footnote:
Rule 404(b) only applies to evidence of acts extrinsic to the
charged crime.... An uncharged act may not be extrinsic if it
was part of the scheme for which a defendant is being prosecut-
ed ... or it was "inextricably intertwined" with the charged crime
such as a witness' testimony would have been confusing and in-
complete without mention of the prior act.
94
In 1992, the Tenth Circuit made this same distinction in United
States v. Pace.95 There, the court held that the actions of a co-con-
spirator, during the course of the conspiracy, were admissible
against the defendant as evidence of the conspiracy and need not
be analyzed under Rule 404(b).
In 1993, the Tenth Circuit was still working to define the
boundaries between extrinsic and intrinsic evidence. In United
States v. Lambert,96 the defendant was charged with bank robbery.
Lambert's co-defendant testified regarding a conversation occur-
ring five days earlier, during which the two men were discussing
the merits of several potential targets, including the bank eventual-
ly robbed. Lambert argued that this conversation was inadmissible
under ER.E. 404(b).The court held that the conversation was in-
trinsic to the crime. It went on to hold:
[o]ther act evidence is intrinsic when the evidence of the other
act and the evidence of the crime charged are inextricably inter-
twined or both acts are part of a single criminal episode or the
other acts were necessary preliminaries to the crime charged.
97
It went on to state, "[s]uch intrinsic 'other act' evidence, although
not excluded by 404(b), is still subject to the requirement of Fed.
R. Evid. 403."9'
In United States v. Kimball,99 the court finally linked the tests
found in Lambert and its predecessors to the term "resgestae." Kim-
ball was convicted of bank robbery. The trial court permitted evi-
dence that he had recently been released from prison and had re-
ported to his parole officer that he was going to live on a very lim-
ited income. It also permitted evidence of his inmate number, a de-
scription of the clothes he was issued when he was released from
prison, and his failure to report to his parole officer. The Tenth Cir-
cuit held that this evidence was admissible as resgestae, in that the
evidence "completed the story." The court stated:
[e]vidence of other crimes should not be suppressed when those
facts come in as resgestae--as part and parcel of the proof of the
offense []charged in the indictment. 100
The court went on to note that "evidence admissible for one of the
purposes specified in Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) and res gestae evidence
are not always separated by a bright line."
a0'
In United States v. Marcks,102 the Tenth Circuit applied the part
and parcel analysis to bar evidence of the defendant's drug use in
a case where the defendant was charged with conspiracy to manu-
facture drugs. The court held that this evidence was not res gestae,
stating, "[d]rug use is not, as the government maintains, 'part and
parcel' of a conspiracy to manufacture drugs."103 However, in Unit-
ed States v. Cromartie,104 the court used the "inextricably inter-
twined" analysis to approve the admission of evidence of drug traf-
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ficking by the defendant in a case where he was charged with, inter
alia, possession of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking felony.
This evidence was deemed admissible as resgestae even though the
defendant was not independently charged with felony drug traf-
ficking. The court held that the evidence was inextricably inter-
twined with the charged crimes.
These tests are still being refined. In 2007, the Tenth Circuit
held that the prosecution was permitted to present evidence that a
shotgun the defendant was accused of possessing was stolen, even
though the defendant was not charged with possession of a stolen
firearm but, instead, with possession of a firearm by a felon. 10 5 The
court listed all of the tests cited in the above cases. However, the
court based its approval of the admission of this evidence on the
theory that evidence the gun was stolen was:
a necessary preliminary to the crime charged ... or in other
words, was necessary to provide a fill presentation of the case
and completion of the story or was so linked together in point
of time and circumstances with the crime charged it was part of
the "resgestae."1
06
In sum, the Tenth Circuit has moved from an analysis that views
res gestae evidence as a part of 404(b) to a separate analysis. This
separate analysis focuses on whether the evidence is intrinsic or ex-
trinsic to the commission of the crime. Although the definition of
"intrinsic" has no single meaning, the court seems to require that
the evidence be either an integral part of the crime charged or nec-
essary for the jury to understand the evidence. The difficulty with
this federal analysis is the large span and scope of many federal in-
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dictments. It is rare that a federal criminal case has to do with just
one event. However, even if the court finds that the evidence is in-
trinsic to the crime, it still must analyze the admissibility of the ev-
idence using a ER.E. 403 analysis.
Conclusion
The doctrine of res gestae has changed dramatically, perhaps even
fundamentally, since its common law origin. Initially, the doctrine
was used to address evidence that now is generally addressed by the
state and federal rules of evidence. The initial application of the
doctrine by the Colorado Supreme Court after the adoption of the
C.R.E. was very restrictive. In the past fifteen years, the Colorado
appellate courts have significantly broadened the applicability of
the doctrine. The Tenth Circuit, using different language, seems to
have followed the same general path as the Colorado courts, al-
though, as a doctrine, resgestae is rarely used or rarely appealed and,
as a result, there are very few Tenth Circuit cases addressing its ad-
missibility.
In large part, this evolution mirrors how both sets of courts have
analyzed the relationship between res gestae and Rule 404(b). Al-
though there is an argument that the doctrine of res gestae was
largely supplanted by the adoption of the federal and Colorado
rules of evidence, this argument has not been adopted by either the
Colorado Supreme Court or the Tenth Circuit. However, because
the U.S. Supreme Court has not weighed in on the issue since the
passage of the F.R.E., there still is an argument that the ever-
broadening doctrine of resgestae will be eliminated or at least se-
verely limited by the U.S. Supreme Court, when and if it finally
does take up the issue. Even under current law, there is sufficient
play in the resgestae doctrine in both state and federal courts that all
practitioners can make some headway in either resisting or ad-
vancing the introduction of critical evidence in criminal cases.
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